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DEVITALIZATION OF THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
TRIAL: THE "PER CASE" METHOD v. THE
"PER SE" THEORY
J. MICHAEL MYERS
Emanating initially from the Magna Carta, the protection afforded the
criminally accused of a right to a speedy trial has ascended through history
to its present day status as a fundamental and basic privilege. This assurance against excessive pretrial delay as guaranteed by the sixth amendment
has been adopted by all 50 states.' Although the United States Supreme
Court has infrequently been called upon to adjudicate disputes arising under
speedy trial claims, 2 there remains considerable confusion as to what constitutes a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. The gravamen of the
problem is that the Court has consistently avoided prescribing a doctrine
that would circumvent much of the maze in which the right to a speedy trial
is embroiled. Although this sixth amendment assurance has survived almost
300 years of American jurisprudence, there has never been a uniform standard by which to measure speedy trial claims. While the state legislatures
and courts have been active in prescribing limitation periods in which to
bring the criminal defendant to trial, the federal courts are only now in the
process of confronting the problem. The inability of the Supreme Court to
pronounce a specific doctrine has shifted this burden to the lower federal
courts. The innovators among the circuits, in encountering this challenge,
have proposed and adopted plans by which to facilitate the prompt disposition of criminal cases. Limitation periods in which to bring the accused to
trial, and the similar approach in which the defendant is prejudiced "per se"
if he is not brought to trial within a certain time period have been advocated
by the courts. In adopting defined standards by which to determine speedy
trial claims, a constant and uniform application is effected in which the same
standards are applied to each presented case. These methods are preferable
to the generally applied "per case" theory, under which the courts have
been compelled to adjudicate each case on an ad hoc basis, employing
varied methods with often unjust results. It is the purpose of this paper to
reveal the injustices generated by the continued use of the presently administered "per case" method, and to describe the beneficial aspects of the en1. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226, 87 S. Ct. 988, 995, 18 L. Ed.
2d 1, 9 (1967).
2. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, -, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2184, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101,
108 (1972).
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actment of consistent principles that would diminish the plight in which the
courts are currently enmeshed when dealing with a contention of denial of
the right to a speedy trial.
SPEEDY TRIAL GENERALLY

On the surface, the right to a speedy trial would seem to be a corporeal
term which has long been one of the most fundamental rights granted under
the Constitution. However, upon application, severe difficulties arise, as
there has never been a valid definition of speedy trial. The greatest problem has been that of time-when is the criminal defendant deprived of a
speedy trial? There have been as yet no answers to this query, although the
courts are presently weighing possible alternatives to apply to speedy trial
claims. Without the enactment of a defined standard, the right to a speedy
trial is seriously endangered. Thus the alternatives-the vague "per case"
method or balancing test and the specific "per se" approach-have taken on
an exceptional importance, and it is imperative to the preservation of the
speedy trial right that the courts make the proper choice. To gain a
greater understanding of these standards and of the right to a speedy trial
generally, it is necessary to examine the foundations under which this sixth
amendment right has arisen.
Foundationof the Sixth Amendment
The sixth amendment provides for a speedy trial in all criminal prosecutions. 3 It has been stated that the right to a speedy trial "has its roots in the
very foundation of our English law heritage" 4 and is as fundamental as any
of the rights bestowed by the sixth amendment. 5' Although the intentions of
the founders in enacting the sixth amendment are not known, 6 such has
been constructed by an examination of the legal literature which they then
had at their access. 7 Yet there have been no concrete interpretations as to
what is meant in the bestowal of a right to a speedy trial, although it has
been concluded that "[t]he right to a speedy trial is not a theoretical or abstract right but one rooted in hard reality in the need to have charges
Even this definition suffers by the lack of defining
promptly exposed."
promptly, which is easily equated with speedy. Therefore it may be expedient to look at the criteria generally utilized in formulating a decision as to
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S. Ct. 988, 993, 18 L. Ed. 2d

1, 8 (1967).
5. Id. at 223, 87 S. Ct. at 993, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 8.
6. Id. at 225, 87 S. Ct. at 994, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 9.
7. Id. at 225, 87 S. Ct. at 994, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 9.
8.

Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37, 90 S. Ct. 1564, 1568, 26 L. Ed. 2d 26,

32 (1970).
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whether or not the criminally accused has been denied his right to a speedy
trial.
The Role of Prejudicein Speedy Trial Determination
Most jurisdictions agree that prejudice is an essential element of a speedy
trial claim. 9 The Supreme Court defined the purpose of the sixth amendment as being:
[T]o prevent undue and oppressive incarcerationprior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit
the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to

defend himself.10

These elements have generally been held to be the tests in determining
whether or not the defendant has sustained prejudice resulting from delay."
It has also been stated that lengthy prosecution may subject an accused to
"public scorn and 'deprive him of employment, and almost certainly will
force curtailment of his speech, associations and participation in unpopular
causes. '"12 Yet concrete evidence of prejudice is often difficult to display. 13
The task of proving actual prejudice is feasible when the defendant alleges
prejudice by way of "undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial' 1 4 or
through "anxiety and concern."' 15 However, the defendant is under an obvious detriment when making an allegation that there has been an impairment of his right to defend himself. The difficulty of measuring the cost of
delay in terms of the dimmed memories and unavailability of witnesses was
expressed in Dickey v. Florida,'6 and it was concluded that proof of the materiality of once available witnesses and documents would be almost impossible.

17

9. See United States v. Gray, 429 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
960 (1970); United States v. Orsinger, 428 F.2d 1105, 1114-15 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Brooks v. United States, 423 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 872 (1970); Needel v. Scafati, 412 F.2d 761 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 861 (1969); Oden v. United States, 410 F.2d 103 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 863 (1969); Guillory v. Wilson, 402 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1968).
10. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 776, 15 L. Ed. 2d
627, 630 (1966) (emphasis added).
11. United States v. Colitto, 319 F. Supp. 1077, 1078 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
12. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222, 87 S.Ct. 988, 993, 18 L. Ed.
2d 1, 7 (1967).
13. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 53, 90 S. Ct. 1564, 1576, 26 L. Ed. 2d 26,
41 (1970).
14. See generally United States v. Strunk, 467 F.2d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 1972);
Coleman v. United States, 442 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Wynn,
54 F.R.D. 72, 75 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
15. Clark v. Oliver, 346 F. Supp. 1345, 1350 (E.D. Va. 1972). The court stated
that "at the very least he [the defendant] was prejudiced by virtue of living under a
cloud of suspicion and anxiety."
16. 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1970).
17. Id. at 53, 90 S.Ct. at 1577, 26 L. Ed. at 41.
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The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in Dickey expressly directed attention to the role of prejudice in relation to the constitutional
guarantee of speedy trial and the complexities generated by it. Justice
Brennan, in recognizing prejudice to be an essential element of speedy trial
violations, 18 urged that there be an assumption of prejudice in favor of the
accused upon a showing of denial of rapid prosecution.' 9 Mr. Justice Brennan concluded:
The difficulty in such an approach, of course, lies in determining how
long a prosecution must be delayed before prejudice is assumed. It is
likely that generalized standards would have to be developed to indicate
when during the course of a delay there arises a probability of substantial prejudice. Until delay exceeds that point, the burden most probably
20
would remain on the accused to show that he was actually harmed.
Nevertheless the Court in Dickey declined to assert that an unreasonable
and unnecessary delay of almost 8 years, accompanied by numerous demands by the defendant that he be brought to trial, constituted prejudice
"per se. ' ' 2 1
The Court was confronted with similar difficulties in United States v.
Marion,22 and expanded its previous position by stating that "[p]ossible
prejudice is inherent in any delay, however short. ' '23 Yet the Court went on
to justify a 3-year delay between indictment and trial as not being "sufficient
reason to wrench the Sixth Amendment from its proper context. '24 Prejudice to the defendant is only one of the criteria to be applied in determining
speedy trial claims, and without some degree of delay, prejudice is insignificant.
Delay as an Essential Element in Denial of the Right to a Speedy Trial

Although delay has taken on a secondary import to the role of prejudice,
it is nevertheless a necessary ingredient for a speedy trial claim. The Supreme Court, in Beavers v. Haubert,25 noted that "[t]he right of a speedy
trial is necessarily relative.

It is consistent with delays .

. .

. It does not

preclude the rights of public justice."' 26 This statement was subsequently
qualified by the Court as meaning that the delay should be neither purposeful nor oppressive 27 and that the fundamental element is orderly expedition
18. Id. at 53, 90 S. Ct. at 1576, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 41.
19. Id. at 55, 90 S. Ct. at 1577, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 42.
20. Id. at 55, 90 S. Ct. at 1577, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 42.
21. Id. at 38, 90 S. Ct. at 1569, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 32.
22. 404 U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971).
23. Id. at 14, 92 S. Ct. at 464, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 479.
24. Id. at 14, 92 S. Ct. at 464, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 479.
25. 198 U.S. 77, 25 S. Ct. 573, 49 L. Ed. 950 (1905).
26. Id. at 87, 25 S. Ct. at 576, 49 L. Ed. at 954.
27. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361, 77 S. Ct. 481, 486, 1 L. Ed. 2d
393, 399 (1957).
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Even though it has been generally held

that mere time alone will not suffice in a contention of denial of speedy
trial, 2 9 it has been observed that passage of time may dangerously reduce
the defendant's capacity to counter the charges of the prosecution.' °
Wide discrepancies have emerged among the courts in their attempts to
calculate the length of time that shall be deemed excessive, 31 depending
generally on the circumstances of each case.

It is necessary, therefore to

examine what delay on the part of the prosecution is to be considered reasonable.
There are no set standards by which to measure reasonable delay, but instead a myriad of decisions based upon diverse circumstances. Obviously
the delay must not be purposeful or oppressive,3 2 but otherwise any delay
seems reasonable, no matter how insubstantial the reason. Factors such as
the judge being committed to another case, 3" illness of the judge, 34 shortage
of prosecuting attorneys, 3 5 lack of a judge in the district,3 6 and the death of
the judge 37 have been held to constitute sufficient cause for the delay. However, mere inconvenience in scheduling the trial38 and insufficient funds
to transport the defendant to the place of trial 9 have been held not to be
28. Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10, 79 S. Ct. 991, 997, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1041,
1048 (1959).
29. United States v. DeMasi, 445 F.2d 251, 255 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v.
DeCosta, 435 F.2d 630, 632 (1st Cir. 1970).
30. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 42, 90 S. Ct. 1564, 1571, 26 L. Ed. 2d 26,
34 (1970).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Strunk, 467 F.2d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 1972) (finding
that a delay of 8 months was excessive). Contra, Hardy v. United States, 343 F.2d
233, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (holding that a delay of 8 months was not excessive).
32. See Brady v. Superintendent, 443 F.2d 1307 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Butler, 426 F.2d 1275, 1277 (1st Cir. 1970) (finding that "the delays must serve some
legitimate purpose"); Brooks v. United States, 423 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Dooling, 406 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1969); Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210
(D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Baron, 336 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); cf.
United States v. Cartano, 420 F.2d 362, 363 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1054
(1970), wherein it is stated that "the denial of a motion to dismiss . . . for a delay
which falls short of a constitutional defect, will be reversed only on a showing of an
abuse of discretion." United States v. DeCosta, 435 F.2d 630, 632 (1st Cir. 1970).
The court held that the defendant must show improper motivation on the part of the
government.
33. Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 1969).
34. Id. at 552.
35. United States v. Heard, 443 F.2d 856 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850
(1971).
36. United States v. Williams, 416 F.2d 4, 9 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 968 (1970).
37. United States v. Jackson, 369 F.2d 936, 939 (4th Cir. 1966).
38. United States v. Polley, 453 F.2d 400, 401 (5th Cir. 1971).
39. Beck v. United States, 442 F.2d 1037, 1038 (5th Cir. 1971); cf. Falgout v.
Trujillo, 270 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D. Colo. 1966) in which the court, in stating that
"there has to be some point at which the period of delay becomes so intolerable that
it is not enough that one is being treated the same as other defendants," found that
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good cause for delay. Thus, as with the tests for prejudice and length of delay, the courts are hampered without the benefit of defined rules on which
to base their judgments. A look at the attempts of the federal courts to apply the indefinite standards of the "per case" method, and a view of the
benefits in the utilization of the "per se" method should aid in an understanding of the difficulties involved.
THE "PER CASE" APPROACH IN DETERMINING WHETHER
OR NOT THE CRIMINALLY ACCUSED HAS BEEN DENIED
THE RIGHT

TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

Lacking the benefit of a standard as to what comprises a denial of the
right to a speedy trial, the courts have had to grapple with the problem employing a "per case" method in which each case is decided on its own facts.
Although the methods applied have been similar, the resulting interpretations have varied considerably. Prejudice to the defendant is generally considered to be one of the most crucial criteria for determining impermissible
pretrial delay,40 although some jurisdictions have prescribed a rule whereby
a showing of prejudice is not necessary when the criminal defendant asserts
a speedy trial claim. 41 However, in those jurisdictions basing the determination of speedy trial claims on prejudice, even the definition of "prejudice"
has proven to be a thorny problem. According to some constructions, the
criminal defendant may not be considered prejudiced unless there has been
a purposeful oppression or prejudice to the ability of the accused to defend
42
himself at trial.
The Federal Courts
The "per case" approach has been almost universally applied by the federal courts, with a wide disparity of results. Undue delays that have seen
the death of witnesses,43 refusals by witnesses to testify 44 and faded memories
of witnesses4 5 have been determined not to be prejudicial to the defendant's
case. However, the court in United States v. Johnston,46 while admitting
that "prejudice may be presumed . . . from the fact that the passage of
it is not an excuse that the court is conducting its business in an orderly manner.
Id. at 688.
40. United Staes v. Alo, 439 F.2d. 751, 755 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850
(1971). See also United States v. Colitto, 319 F. Supp. 1077, 1079 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
41. United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 477 (2d Cir. 1958).
42. Morton v. Haynes, 332 F. Supp. 890, 893 (E.D. -Mo. 1971); cf. United
States v. Johnston, 328 F. Supp. 100, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The court held that
there must be a "compelling showing of prejudice."
43. Woody v. United States, 370 F.2d 214, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
44. Id. at 217.
45. Murray v. Wainwright, 450 F.2d 465, 471 (5th Cir. 1971).
46. 328 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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time will have dimmed the memory of witnesses," 4 7 nevertheless found that
the defendant had not been deprived of his right to a speedy trial even
though he had been incarcerated in excess of 8 years between indictment
and trial. 48 Like decisions have been rendered even though the pretrial delay has been caused by administrative blunders in the district attorney's office 49 and by the trial court's erroneous assumption that it had no jurisdiction to proceed. 50 It has been held, however, that a negligent prosecutorial
delay may violate the constitutional guarantees to a speedy trial. 51 Thus it
may be seen that the federal courts have found it difficult to discern if and
upon what circumstances the criminal defendant has been prejudiced by an
excessive delay.
The various circuits have also adhered to the rule that a mere lapse of time
is not sufficient to establish a violation of the speedy trial right. 52 In
United States v. Mancusi 53 the court, in noting that dismissal has rarely been
granted for a delay over several years, 54 stated that it knew of "no case
. . .in which a delay of less than a year has been thought to satisfy the
'length of delay' requirement. ' 55 Moreover it has been found that there are
cases that demand preparation in excess of 34 months, and some situations
may warrant a much longer period, 56 with the burden on the defendant to
show that he has been denied his right to a speedy trial. 57 A few circuits
have followed this theory:
[A]ny appreciable delay between arrest and trial in and of itself raises
the issue [of denial of the defendant's right to a speedy trial] and at the
very least places on the prosecution a heavy burden of demonstrating
that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right has not been abridged. 58
The length of delay requirement has been clothed in terms such as "appreciable delay,"'59 "inexcusable delay, ' '60 and "excessive delay" 61-vague measures to apply in deciphering whether or not a criminal defendant has been
dispossessed of a constitutionally guaranteed right. Yet both the federal
courts and the United States Supreme Court have been hesitant to adopt a
47. Id. at 110.
48. Id. at 110.
49. Stuart v. Craven, 456 F.2d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 1972).
50. United States v. James, 459 F.2d 443, 444-45 (5th Cir. 1972).
51. Hanrahan v. United States, 348 F.2d 363, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
52. Fleming v. United States, 378 F.2d 502, 504 (1st Cir. 1967).
53. 412 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1969).
54. Id. at 90.
55. Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
56. United States v. Mark II Electronics, 283 F. Supp. 280, 285 (E.D. La. 1968).
57. See United States v. DeCosta, 435 F.2d 630, 632 (1st Cir. 1970); United
States v. Dooling, 406 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Pinero, 329
F. Supp. 992, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
58. Clark v. Oliver, 346 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 (E.D. Va. 1972) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 1349.
60. United States v. Blauner, 337 F. Supp. 1383, 1390 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
61. United States v. Colitto, 319 F. Supp. 1077, 1079 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
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prejudice "per se" approach,6 2 which would alleviate much of the doubt and
facilitate the rights of both the defendant and the public, in recognizing a
stated time period of limitation in which the criminally accused must be
brought to trial.
BARKER V. WINGO

The Supreme Court had the opportunity to allay much of the doubt and
perplexity in which the right to a speedy trial was immersed when it recently
decided the case of Barker v. Wingo.6 3 In Barker the defendant and one
Silas Manning were accused in the beating death of an elderly couple on
July 20, 1958. Barker and Manning were indicted shortly thereafter, and
Barker's case was set for trial approximately 1 month after the issuance of
the indictment. The state, having the stronger case against Manning, believed Barker could not be convicted unless Manning was first convicted.
This they set out to do, obtaining the first of what eventually resulted in 16
continuances of the Barker trial. More than 4 years later, Manning was
convicted on both counts. Even so, numerous delays followed, all occasioned by the prosecution, and Barker was brought to trial only after 5-year
prorocation since issuance of the indictment. Upon trial, Barker was convicted and given a life sentence. He appealed, contending his right to a
speedy trial had been violated.
The Court, in distinguishing the right to a speedy trial as being "generically
different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the
protection of the accused," 64 discussed the right at length and set out the
criteria by which the courts should ascertain whether a defendant may be
considered as having been denied his right to a speedy trial.6 5 In citing
United States v. Simmons, 66 the Court stated the four factors to be considered as: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion
of his right 6 7 and prejudice to the defendant.6 The Court went on to state
that these factors were not to be considered individually, but instead should
be taken together along with other circumstances that might be relevant to
69
the case at hand.
62. See, e.g., Stuart v. Craven, 456 F.2d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 1972). See also
United States v. Hanna, 41 U.S.L.W. 2163 (D. Del. Oct. 3, 1972); United States v.
Daley, 454 F.2d 505, 508 (1st Cir. 1972).
63. 407 U.S. 514, -, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).
64. Id. at -, 92 S. Ct. at 2186, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 110.
65. id. at -,
92 S. Ct. at 2192-93, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117-18.
66. 338 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 383 (1965).
67. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, -, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 117

(1972), wherein the Court stated that "Et]he more serious the deprivation, the more
likely the defendant is to complain." However, the Court went on to weaken the impact of this standard by rejecting the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a
speedy trial forever waives his right. Id. at -, 92 S. Ct. at 2191, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 115.
68. Id. at -, 92 S. Ct. at 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117.
69. Id. at -,
92 S. Ct. at 2193, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118.
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In reference to the length of the delay requirement, the Court discussed
the suggestion that a method be adopted wherein a criminal defendant must
be offered a trial within a specified time period. 70 While the Court recognized that the adoption of such a standard would clarify when there was an
infringement of the right as well as aid the court's application of it, 71 the
72
Court found it impossible to determine when the right had been denied.
The Court concluded that there was "no constitutional basis for holding that
the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or

74
months."73s While endorsing such an approach for the states, the Court
nevertheless adopted a balancing ("per case") test in which the aforementioned criteria would be applied in weighing the conduct of both the prose75
cution and the defendant.

Thus the Court in effect adopted a "per case" method in which different
weights would be assigned to different reasons 76-- a standard almost identical
to the procedure previously applied to contentions by criminal defendants
alleging a denial of the right to a speedy trial. In accepting the balancing
test and rejecting the defined limitation period ("per se" method) in which
a criminally accused would be brought to trial, the Court promulgated the
defects that have created the quandary among the courts in the application
of the right to a speedy trial, and avoided prescribing an approach that
would result in a method that could be uniformly and specifically administered. Unlike the Supreme Court, the courts of the military have been
rapid in formulating an exact standard to apply in speedy trial claims.
The Military Courts
The right to a speedy trial is one of the sixth amendment rights which has
inured to an accused in the military.77 The courts of the military originally
adopted the "per case" method, holding that "the interval of time between
initial confinement in connection with the charge and the date of trial is not
the sole determinant of the issue, but only one of the factors to be considered,"7 8 and rejected the "per se" approach. 79
70. Id. at -, 92 S. Ct. at 2188, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 112.
71. Id. at ,92 S. Ct. at 2188, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 112.
72. Id. at
92 S. Ct. at 2187, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 112.
73. Id. at
92 S. Ct. at 2188, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 113.
74. Id. at
92 S. Ct. at 2191, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 113.
75. Id. at
92 S. Ct. at 2191, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 116.
76. Id. at
92 S. Ct. at 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117.
77. United States v. Hounshell, 21 C.M.R. 129 (1955). See also United States
v. Cluff, 41 C.M.R. 1017 (1970).
78. United States v. Hawes, 40 C.M.R. 176, 177 (1969). See generally United
States v. Parish, 38 C.M.R. 209 (1968); United States v. Callahan, 27 C.M.R. 230
(1959).
79. United States v. Pierce, 41 C.M.R. 225 (1970).
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However, the military courts have more recently revised their standard,
finding that undue pretrial delay may become incidental and unusual punishment.80 The court in United States v. Burton,8 ' while expressing a hesitancy to apply rigid time limits,8 2 nevertheless found that in some situations
the length and circumstances of pretrial confinement can be prejudicial in
themselves.8 3 The court concluded that "in the absence of defense requests
for continuance, a presumption of . . . violation will exist when pretrial

confinement exceeds three months."'8 4 In applying this presumption, a heavy
burden is placed on the prosecution to show diligence, and in the absence
of such a showing, charges will be dismissed. 8 5 To discharge this burden, the
prosecution must show that it has proceeded with reasonable diligence in
bringing the charge to trial.8 6 This is done when the government accounts
for the period of time from the date the accused was restrained or from the
date charges were preferred, whichever is earliest.8 7 It has been held that
where the prosecution offers no explanation for the delay there is a denial of
88
the right to a speedy trial.
Delays caused by complex investigations," detention of the accused by
civil authorities, 90 the need of additional investigation91 and investigation of
unrelated charges 9 2 have been held to be good reasons for excessive pretrial dentention. However, delays resulting in the deprival of the personal
testimony of witnesses 93 and the processing of additional charges 94 have been
held not to be valid reasons. The government may not excuse lengthy delay
by inadvertent negligence 9 5 or good faith in prosecuting the defendant. 96
It has been determined that the yardstick for measuring denial of the
speedy trial right is reasonable diligence in bringing the criminal defendant
to trial. 97
80.
81.
82.
83.

United States v. Jameson, 42 C.M.R. 929, 932 (1970).
44C.M.R. 166 (1971).
Id. at 172. See also United States v. Goode, 38 C.M.R.382 (1968).
Id. at 171; see United States v. Keaton, 40 C.M.R.212 (1969).

84. Id. at 172.
85. Id. at 172.

86. United States v. Owes, 44 C.M.R. 591, 593 (1971). See also United States
v. Tibbs, 35 C.M.R. 322 (1965).
87. Id. at 593; see United States v. Williams, 30 C.M.R. 81 (1961); United States
v. Callahan, 27 C.M.R. 230 (1959).
88. United States v. Hubbard, 44 C.M.R. 185, 187 (1971).
89. United States v. Safford, 40 C.M.R. 528 (1970).
90. United States v. Keaton, 40 C.M.R. 458 (1970).
91. United States v. Dunn, 44 C.M.R.. 929, 934 (1972).
92. United States v. Owes, 44 C.M.R. 591, 594 (1971). See also United States v.
Ray, 43 C.M.R. 171 (1971); United States v. Brakefield, 43 C.M.R. 828 (1971).
93. United States v. DuPree, 42 C.M.R. 681, 682 (1970).
94. United States v. Phare, 44 C.M.R. 348, 350-51 (1971).
95. United States v. Ervin, 42 C.M.R. 289, 290 (1970).
96. Id. at 290.
97. United States v.Lutz, 44 C.M.R. 518, 520 (1971).
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The military courts have in effect formulated a blending of the "per se"
and "per case" theories, placing a heavy burden on the prosecution after delay has exceeded 3 months, but allowing the prosecution to discharge this
burden by a showing of reasonable diligence. While the military courts have
been rapid to prescribe easily applicable standards by which to adjudicate
speedy trial claims, the state and federal courts are only presently searching
for a uniform method, and the United States Supreme Court has made an
outright rejection of such an approach.
THE "PER SE" APPROACH IN DETERMINING WHETHER
OR NOT THE CRIMINALLY ACCUSED HAS BEEN DENIED

THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

Each of the 50 states has embodied the right to a speedy trial within their
individual state statutes98 and the fourteenth amendment makes the sixth
amendment guarantee of a right to a speedy trial applicable to the states.99
The Supreme Court, in rendering the Barker decision, stated that "[tihe
states . . . are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with consti-

tutional standards,"100 while rejecting the adoption of such a standard for
the federal courts.' 0 '

Thirty-four state legislatures have enacted statutes

02
limiting the period in which a criminal defendant may be brought to trial,

98. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226, 87 S.Ct. 988, 995, 18 L. Ed.
2d 1, 9 (1967).
99. Id. at 222, 87 S.Ct. at 993, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 8.
100. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, -, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2191, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101,
113 (1972).
101. Id. at -, 92 S. Ct. at 2191, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 113.
102. ARKc. STAT. ANN. § 43-1708 (1964) (If incarcerated, the defendant must be
brought to trial by the second court term after indictment); id. § 43-1709 (1964) (If
on bail, the defendant must be brought to trial by the third court term after indictment); CAL. GEN. LAws ANN. § 1382 (Deering 1970) (defendant must be brought to
trial within 60 days after the finding of the indictment); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 39-1-3 (1963) (defendant must be brought to trial within 3 years after indictment);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6910 (1953) (second term after indictment); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 3.191 (Supp. 1972) (90 days for a misdemeanor; 180 days for a felony); GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-1901 (1972) (next 'term after indictment); HAWAII Rnv. LAws
§ 635-3 (1968) (6 years after indictment); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3501 (1948)
(next term after indictment); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5 (1970) (if incarcerated,
120 days from the date taken into custody; if on bail, 160 days from the date the
defendant demands trial); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1402 (1956) (two terms after indictment if incarcerated); Id. § 9-1403 (three terms after indictment if on bail); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 795.2 (Supp. 1973) (60 days after indictment); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 621301 (1964) (same term as indictment); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (1964)
(next term after indictment); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 277, § 72 (1968) (the defendant
must be brought to trial within 6 months if incarcerated); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
611.04 (1964) (next term of court after indictment); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 545.890
(1953) (second court term after indictment); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-1703
(Supp. 1971) (6 months after indictment); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1202 (1965) (second
term of court after indictment); NEV. REv. STAT. § 178.495 (1963) (60 days after
indictment); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-23-37 (Supp. 1972) (6 months after indictment);

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

11

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 5 [2022], No. 1, Art. 7

1973]

COMMENTS

thus adopting an approach whereby the criminal defendant is prejudiced per
se if the stated period is violated and good cause is not shown for the excessive delay. 10 3
These statutes, implementing state constitutional provisions,1 04 define
10 5 months' 0 6 and court terms., 0 7
speedy trial in quantitative terms of days,
By the enactment of such limitation periods the States provide for a more
accelerated pretrial procedure than the federal courts have required under
the indefinite standard of the sixth amendment. Numerous state statutes
bestow rights to those incarcerated and those free on bail, and the relief is
acquittal of the charge; 0 8 other statutes benefit only those held in actual
custody, and the relief is release on bail or recognizance.' 0 9

One jurisdictional treatment of the statutory limitation period is that of a
strict construction and unless the prosecution can present a good excuse for
the unreasonable delay, the indictment against the criminal defendant is dismissed. 110 Other jurisdictions interpret the limitation periods with laxity,
N.Y. CONSOLIDATED LAWS § 30330 (McKinney Supp. 1973) (90 days from commence-

ment of a criminal action where the defendant is accused of a felony; 6 months
from commencement of a criminal action where the defendant is accused of a misdemeanor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-10 (1965) (second court term after indictment);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-18-01 (1960) (next term after indictment); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2945.71 (Baldwin 1971)
(two terms after indictment); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 812 (1969) (next court term after indictment); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 12-13-7 (Supp. 1972) (6 months after indictment); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-509
(1962) (second court term after indictment); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2102 (1955)
(next court term after indictment); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 32.01 (1966) (next
term of court after taken into custody if no indictment is presented); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-51-1 (1953) (next term after indictment); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-191 (1960)
(third court term after indictment); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.46.010 (1961) (60
days after indictment); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 955.10 (1958) (next term after indictment); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-236 (1957) (next term after imprisonment).
103. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 795.2 (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.04
(1964); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-1703 (Supp. 1971).
104. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-161 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. art. 1, § 6 (1946).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 13 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2001 (1955); TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 10 stating that "[in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury." See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.05
(1966).
105. FLA.STAT. ANN.§ 3.191 (Supp. 1972).
106. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 277, § 72 (1968).
107. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1901 (1972).
108. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (1964).
109. IOWA CODE ANN. § 795.2 (Supp. 1973).
110. See State v. Mathis, 319 P.2d 134, 136 (Utah 1957) wherein it is stated that
"the statutory limitations . . . are maximums, and . . . anyone accused of a crime,
especially one incarcerated awaiting trial, is entitled under our law to have his case
tried with all possible dispatch, if he so desires." See also Blevins v. State, 149 S.E.2d
423, 425 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) which, in citing 21 AM. JuR. Criminal Law § 242
(1965), construed the intent of the limitation statute as being to prevent the defendant "from being exposed to the hazard of trial after the lapse of so great a time that
the means of proving his innocence may have been lost."
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often reluctant to allow the defendant dismissal."' The reasoning within
the jurisdictions varies considerably, from the theory that speedy trial does not
mean immediate trial but rather trial without unreasonable and unnecessary
delay, 112 to rulings based on the supposition that "[tihe mere passage of
time alone. . . is insufficient to reverse and dismiss charges because of the
denial of a right of a speedy trial."'1 Such decisions have endorsed delays
in excess of 5 years. 114 Obviously these jurisdictions, although theoretically
bound by the statutory provisions, are acting on a "per case" approach in
viewing the circumstances of each presented case.
Since the Barker decision a number of the state courts have employed the
recommended balancing test,"' although at least one jurisdiction, Pennsylvania, has denounced such a standard. In Commonwealth v. Hamilton'"
the court stated that "experience has demonstrated that under this type of
approach [the balancing test], there has been little success in eliminating
criminal backlogs in populous counties where delays and the evils they create
are most severe."' 17 The court thus repudiated the balancing test and
adopted a stated time period within which the criminally accused must be
111. See State v. Falter, 495 P.2d 694, 695 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (emphasis
added) in which the court declared that "when the legislature enacted the 60-day rule,
it did not conceive nor contemplate that the limitation so established should become an
inflexible yardstick by which the constitutional guarantees to a speedy trial of
felony charges would be measured." See also State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d 351
(Iowa 1972); State v. Peterson, 189 N.W.2d 891 (Iowa 1971).
112. State v. Frith, 194 So. 1, 5 (La. 1940); see Clark v. Commonwealth, 293
S.W.2d 465 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923 (1957); State v. Keefe,
98 P. 122, 126 (Wyo. 1908); cf. People v. Lanigan, 140 P.2d 24, 30 (Cal. 1943)
(finding that docket congestion is a sufficient ground for delay); State v. Goodmiller,
386 P.2d 365, 367 (Idaho 1963); State v. Campbell, 85 P. 784, 787 (Kan. 1906)
(standing for the proposition that a delay made necessary by the usual and ordinary
procedure in criminal cases is permissible); State v. Kuhnhausen, 272 P.2d 225, 241
(Ore. 1954); State v. Lee, 224 P. 627, 628 (Ore. 1924); State v. Pratt, 107 N.W. 538,
539 (S.D. 1906) (finding that postponement of trial because of the absence of a material prosecution witness does not violate the defendant's constitutional rights); Denham v. Robinson, 77 S.E. 970, 974 (W. Va. 1913) (lack of time during the remainder
of the term to try a case on its merits constitutes unavoidable delay). But cf.
State v. Carillo, 16 P.2d 965, 966 (Ariz. 1932) (finding that delay is not warranted
on a contention that there were not enough cases to justify summoning a trial jury);
Castle v. State, 143 N.E.2d 570, 573 (Ind. 1957) (finding that delays beyond the
period required by an implementing statute are not justified by inadequate court
room facilities).
113. Courtney v. State, 472 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). But see
Editorial, 7 TEx. BAR J. 5 (1944) stating that "[l]ong unnecessary delays . . . can
and should, be avoided." See generally Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182 (4th
Cir. 1968).
114. See Robinson v. State, 470 S.W.2d 697, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). See
generally Josey v. State, 117 S.E.2d 641, 643 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960).
115. See, e.g., State v. Hunter, 295 A.2d 779 (Md. Ct. App. 1972); Tate v. Howard, 296 A.2d 19 (R.I. 1972).
116. 297 A.2d 127 (Pa. 1972).
117. Id. at 131.
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either brought to trial or released from any threat of prosecution. 118 The
rationale for formulating such a rule was to eliminate "the inherent vagueness encompassed in any balancing process" 119 by avoiding the necessity of
a court determining a violation of a constitutional right on a case by case
basis. 120 The court went on to note that the mandatory time requirement
would stimulate those entrusted with the responsibility of managing court
calendars, 12 help eliminate court congestion 1 22 and act as a more effective
protection of the speedy trial right.' 23 Thus the foundations of the balancing
test are already beginning to weaken and the state court application of the
prejudice "per se" doctrine will certainly see expansion in the future.
THE FEDERAL COURTS-A TREND TO THE "PER SE" DOCTRINE

Judicial Treatment
Although the prevalent formula utilized by the federal courts in adjudicating controversies involving the right to a speedy trial is that of viewing the
circumstances of each case, there has been strong opposition to the "per
case" method.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has proclaimed
that "any delay which exceeds a period of one year between arrest and trial
raises a speedy trial claim of prima facie merit.' 24 It has also been stated
that unreasonable delays are by nature prejudicial, 25 and that it is generally
unnecessary for the defendant to make an affirmative demonstration of prejudice.' 26 In Smith v. United States127 the court expressed the opinion that
"a delay prior to trial of more than one year, not attributable to the defense,
automatically calls for dismissal of the indictment, due to prejudice to the
person."' 128 The court went on to observe that intolerable delays prior to
29
trial help breed crime.1
118. Id. at 133.
119.

Id. at 132.

120. Id. at 132-33.
121. Id. at 133.
122. Id. at 133.
123. Id. at 133.

124. United States v. Hines, 455 F.2d 1317, 1332 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 969 (1972).
125. Hedgepeth v. United States, 364 F.2d 684, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
126.

Id. at 688.

The court went on to state that "[t]here is no touchstone of

time which sets a fixed maximum period that automatically requires application of
the Sixth Amendment and dismissal of the indictment.

Time is but one factor, al-

beit the most important; the longer the time between arrest and trial, the heavier the
burden of the Government in arguing that the right to a speedy trial has not been
abridged." Id. at 687.
127. 418 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 936 (1969).
128. Id. at 1122 (emphasis added).

129. Id. at 1121.

See also Tate v. Howard, 296 A.2d 19, 27 (R.I. 1972).

The

court held that "[l]engthy pretrial detention is costly, contributes to the overcrowding

of penal institutions and can cause violence to erupt within the prison population."
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Expressing his opinion in United States v. Dunn,130 Circuit Judge Tamm
advised the adoption of a 1-year rule' 3 ' within which to bring the criminal
defendant to trial. In proposing such a plan, Judge Tamm stated that this
period should be calculated
from the date on which the formal charge against the defendant is
brought in cases where the defendant is in custody on that date. Where
charges
the defendant is not in custody on the date of bringing of formal
1 32
the year should begin to run from the date of his apprehension.
By the adoption of such a rule, which is "in line with the requirements of
the Constitution,"' 13 3 the view was that there would be an elimination of the
34
potential abuses that could arise.'
While the action on the part of the District of Columbia Circuit has been
limited to an expression of dissatisfaction with the "per case" method, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has been the innovator in employing the stated time limitations.' 35 Based on the observation that the number
of claims of violation of speedy trial rights had assumed alarming proportions,'3 the court in United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann 37 enacted a
set of rules designed to accelerate the processing of criminal cases by supplementing the sixth amendment requirements with specific administrative
standards. Among these rules it is declared that "[i]fn cases where a defendant is detained, the government must be ready for trial within 90 days
from the date of detention. If the government is not ready for trial within
such time . . . the defendant shall be released.' 38 However, it must be
noted that this rule does not apply to those defendants serving a term of imprisonment for another offense 1 39 or charged with another crime subsequent to release. 140 As for those defendants not imprisoned, the rules of the
Second Circuit provide that "[iln all cases the government must be ready for
trial within six months from the date of the arrest, service of summons, detention, or the filing of a complaint or of a formal charge upon which the defendant is to be tried . . . whichever is earliest."' 4 ' If there is a violation of
42
this time standard the result is dismissal of the charge.'
130. 459 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
131. Id. at 1125.
132. Id. at 1125.
133. Id. at 1125.
134. Id. at 1125.
135. Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases (1971)
(hereinafter referred to as 2d Cir. R.).
136. United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d 1312, 1314 (2d Cir. 1971).
See also Comment, 71 COLUM. L.REv. 1059 (1971).
137. 437 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1971).
138. 2d Cm. R. at 2.
139. 2d Cm. R. at 2.
140. 2d Cut. R. at 2.
141. 2d Cm. R. at 2.
142. 2d CIR. R. at 2.
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While the judicial treatment of the "per se" method has been pronounced,
the extra-judicial authorities have been even more adamant in prescribing
remedies by which to dispose of the inadequacies propounded by the "per
case" standard.
Extra-JudicialTreatment
In 1967 the President's Crime Commission 143 proposed that the period
from arrest to trial of felony cases be not more than 4 months. 1 44 In citing
the Crime Commission report, the American Bar Association recommended that the speedy trial right be expressed by statute in terms of days
or months running from a specified event, 14 ' although there was no attempt
to identify the number of days or months which, if exceeded without cause,
would constitute a denial of a speedy trial. 146 An even more stringent limitation was expressed by the Honorable William J. Campbell in an address
before the Conference of Metropolitan Chief Judges of the Federal Judicial
47
Center:'
The arraignment and plea on an indictment would have to be scheduled
within a period of two weeks after return of the indictment. A required
conference between prosecutor and defense counsel . . . must be held

within five days after the arraignment. At the conclusion of the pretrial conference a trial date, no less than one nor
more than three
months from the date of the conference, should be set.1 48
Although these recommendations have generated little response, the Judicial Conference of the United States 149 recently voted to recommend to
the Supreme Court the adoption of an amendment to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure requiring each federal district court to adopt a plan for
the prompt disposition of criminal cases." 50 Included in the plans were rules
relating to the time limits within which procedures prior to trial and trial itself should take place."'
143. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 155 (1967).
144. Id.

In addition, the American Bar Association stated that "[alithough the

federal constitution and the constitutions of the states .

.

. provide that the accused

shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial, the precise boundaries of the speedy trial guarantee are far from clear."

Furthermore the ABA reported that "the courts .

.

. have

found the task of determining what events justify extension of the statutory limits a
most difficult one." STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL-AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION

PROJECT ON MINIMUM

STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2, 15

draft 1968).
145. Id. at 14.
146. Id. at 14.
147. 55 F.R.D. 229 (1972).
148. Id. at 244.
149. Judicial Conference, 40 U.S.L.W. 2284 (1972).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were accordingly amended, 52
requiring that a plan for the prompt disposition of criminal cases be adopted
by each federal district court,' 5" subject to the approval of the Judicial Council of the circuit in which the district is located.14 Each plan is to provide
for rules relating to time limits in an attempt to minimize undue delay.' 5
Pursuant to this requirement, the judges of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas have adopted such a plan providing

for stated limitation periods.' 1 6 The proposed limitation periods specify
that "[t]he trial shall commence within 90 days after a plea of not guilty, if
the defendant is held in custody, or within 180 days if he is not in custody."ST
While stating a variety of reasons which would justify an extension of these
time periods, 158 noncompliance with the rules would result in, but not be
152.
153.
154.
155.

FFD. R. CRIM. P. 50(b).

Id.
id.
Id.

156. PLAN OF THE UNrrED STATES Dsmucr COURT FOR THE WESTERN DiSTricT OF
TEXAS FOR ACHIEVING PROMPT DIsPOsiTioN OF CRIMINAL CASES (Proposed Plan 1972).

157. Id. at 2.
158. Id. at 2, 3, 4. Under proposed rule 3, it is stated:
Any period of time prescribed by these rules may be extended by the Court before
or after the particular period to be extended has run. The reason for granting any
such extension shall be set out as a part of the order of extension. Among other
reasons, the Court may take into consideration:
(a) A reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning
the defendant, including, but not limited to, proceedings for the determination of competency and the period during which he isincompetent to
stand trial, extraordinary pre-trial motions, stays, interlocutory appeals,
trial of other charges, and the period during which such matters are under
consideration.
(b) The period of delay resulting from continuances granted by the Court.
The Court shall grant such continuances only if it is satisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice, taking into account the public interest in the prompt disposition of criminal charges and the interest of the
defendant in a speedy trial. Reasons for granting continuances may include but need not be limited to:
(i) a reasonable request made by or with the consent of the defendant
or his counsel;
(ii) the unavailability of evidence material to the government's case,
when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that
such evidence will become available within a reasonable period;
(iii) reasonable additional time needed to prepare the government's
case when justified by exceptional circumstances;
(iv) the absence or unavailability of the defendant;
(v) inability to proceed to trial as to one or more co-defendants when
there is good cause for not granting a severance;
(vi) detention of the defendant in another jurisdiction, provided the
prosecuting attorney makes a showing that he has been diligent
and has made reasonable efforts to obtain the presence of the
defendant for trial;
(vii) lack of counsel for the defendant if it is the result of reasons
other than the failure of the Court to provide counsel for an indigent defendant or the insistence of the defendant on proceeding
without counsel;
(viii) any period of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances.
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limited to, dismissal of the action for unnecessary delay. 15 9 Thus at least
one of the proposed plans has opened the door for the federal courts to grant
relief other than the serious remedy of dismissal, 60 which the United States
Supreme Court has stated is the only possible remedy.'('
Although these plans for the federal district courts will become effective
only upon approval of reviewing panels, 62 their likely adoption may establish the rudiments of a trend that will in effect renounce the vague balancing
test recommended by the Supreme Court. The reasons for adopting plans
relating to the prejudice "per se" method and the stated limitation periods
are glaringly obvious. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, in his first State of the
Judiciary address to the American Bar Association, 163 stated:
If ever the law is to have genuine deterrent effect on the criminal conduct giving us immediate concern, we must make some drastic changes.
The most simple and most obvious remedy is to give the courts the manpower and tools

. .

.

to try criminal cases within sixty days after indict-

ment and then
see what happens. I predict it would sharply reduce the
64
crime rate.1
There is, however, one monumental defect in the plans as they are presently being drafted. Each plan stipulates that a violation of the stated time
periods will not give rise to a constitutional claim,' 6 5 thus thwarting the impact these plans would have on the speedy trial right. Although it is at present uncertain what the effect of the likely adoption of the plans will be on
the right to a speedy trial, there is an obvious attempt by the rule makers
to circumvent this constitutional guarantee. It is submitted that the plans
would be much more effective if prejudice "per se" provisions were incorporated into the plans, thereby eliminating trial docket backlog as well as
reaffirming the speedy trial right.
CONTRAST AND REMEDIES

The Supreme Court and the "per se' method advocates present two distinct streams of thought in their treatment of the right to a speedy trial.
The major areas of contrast involve: (1) the question of the constitutionality of defined periods of limitation; (2) the Court's inability to name a
159. Id. at 4, 5.
160. Id. at 5, 6.
161. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, -,
112 (1972).

92 S. Ct. 2182, 2188, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101,

162. PLAN OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICr COURT FOR THE WESTERN DIsTRIcT OF
TEXAS FOR ACHIEVING PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL CASES at 9 (Proposed Plan

1972).
163. Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970,56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).
164. Id. at 932.
165. PLAN OF THE UNITED STATES DIsTRcT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DIsTRIcT OF
TEXAS FOR ACHIEVING PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL CASES at 1 (Proposed Plan

1972).
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precise period after which the criminal defendant has been denied his
speedy trial right; (3) the Court's unimaginative vision concerning remedies
for a denial of the right.
ConstitutionalBasis
"We find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right
can be quantified into a specified number of days or months."' 66
"[T]his method of calculating the period . . . is in line with the requirements of the Constitution .... ,117
While subject to interpretation, the dichotomy between the viewpoints
of the Supreme Court and the "per se" supporters is most apparent when
dealing with the differing constructions of the sixth amendment. The
Court's position becomes even more untenable in view of the recommendation that the state courts adopt such a plan. 165 The Court in Klopfer found
that the states are bound by the sixth amendment, 6 9 and their exhortation
that the states adopt a defined limitation period is indicative that there is a
constitutional basis for this standard. Clearly the continuation of impalpable
standards such as the "per case" method and the balancing test can only resuit in the rights bestowed upon the citizens by the sixth amendment remaining intangible and obscure.
Determinationof When the Right Has Been Denied
"It is . . . impossible to determine with precision when the right has been
70
denied."1
The Supreme Court may find it onerous to prescribe a precise time period, but the majority of the state courts and the innovators among the federal
courts have encountered no such predicament. The inability of the Court
to advocate such a standard only compounds the confusion surrounding the
sixth amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has enacted specific time periods in which to bring the criminal defendant to trial,
which, if surpassed, raises a presumption that the defendant's speedy trial
1 71
right has been violated.
The diverse and often unjust consequences of touchstones such as the
166. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, -, 92 S.
113 (1972).
167. United States v. Dunn, 459 F.2d 1115, 1125
168. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, -, 92 S.
112-13 (1972).
169. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213,
2d 1, 7 (1967).
170. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, -, 92 S.
112 (1972).
171. 2d Cm. R.
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"per case" theory need not be abided when the more profitable approach
induced by the "per se" method is available. Instead of excessive, unwarrantable delays often prejudicing the criminal defendant, the practice of the
"per se" method will eliminate trial docket backlogs and congestion of the
courts while similarly insuring the defendant and the public of the preservation of the right to a speedy trial. The limitation periods by which the
"per se" theory would be enforced need not be so strictly applied as to
impede the labors of the prosecution. The "per se" method should not be
an inflexible yardstick by which to determine the right to a speedy trial, but
simply a universal standard by which to abrogate injustices arising thereunder.
Judge Tamm, in expressing his opinion in Dunn, stated that "[n]o longer
can we sit by and watch unconscionable delay being justified by equally unconscionable judicial verbiage."'1 72 The standards of a constitutional guarantee should be express and defined, instead of being concealed in the present form of vague, unclear terminology applied with hesitancy and misconception.
Dismissal v. Alternative Remedies
"[T]he unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the 'l7indictment
when the right has been deprived. . . is the only possible remedy.'
The proponents of the prejudice "per se" method and defined limitation
periods between indictment and trial are many. The general objection to
the adoption of such standards is based on the view that the final result will
be the rather harsh relief of absolute dismissal of the indictment. Many of
the courts are obviously reluctant to dismiss a criminal defendant against
whom the prosecution has a formidable case, simply on the ground that
there has been a violation of the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Such
need not be the case. The court in United States v. Strunk,174 while conceding that the defendant had been denied his right to a speedy trial, 175
balked at the possibility of dismissal of the indictment. 176 Instead, the
court credited the convicted defendant with the time accrued in the delay,
making it applicable on his sentence. In this way the court avoided the detrimental relief of outright dismissal, and simultaneously granted the defendant relief upon a valid claim of denial of the right to speedy trial. There
are alternatives to the uncomfortable relief of complete dismissal of the indictment. No longer do the courts have a potent argument for the con172. United States v. Dunn, 459 F.2d 1115, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
173. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, -, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2188, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101,
112 (1972).
174. 467 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1972).
175. Id. at 973.
176. Id. at 973.
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tinued practice of the indefinite "per case" system, particularly when the
perpetuation of this irresolute standard endangers other rights due the criminal defendant.
CONCLUSION

A fundamental right is jeopardized by the excessive pretrial delays enhanced by the vacillating sixth amendment standards. Undue delay in
bringing a criminal defendant to trial is in direct antithesis with the basic
tenet that a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he principle that there is a presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."'177 Obviously there is a hopeless contradiction between the presumption of innocence and an undue pretrial delay.
While remedies such as dismissal and "good time" application might be considered relief for the guilty defendant, any delay in bringing an innocent
defendant to trial is quite intolerable. If the courts are to continue the "innocent until proven guilty" presumption, pretrial delay becomes even more
indefensible, as all defendants must be treated as innocent until they are
granted the speedy and public trial guaranteed them by the sixth amendment. Enactment of the prejudice "per se" method will bolster the right of
presumption of innocence as well as act as a reassertion of the speedy trial
guarantee.
Adoption of the prejudice "per se" method implemented with the stated
time limitations will support the right to a speedy trial with the proper degree of uniformity and clarity. The federal courts should be lauded for their
recent achievements in requiring the adoption of time limitation plans, but
they should be encouraged to incorporate within such plans provisions
whereby undue delay on the part of the prosecution will give rise to a constitutional claim. Such advantages are invaluable in dealing with the guarantee provided in the sixth amendment, and it is suggested that the federal
district courts adopt prejudice "per se" provisions within their plans in order
to avoid the injustices promulgated by the "per case" method and the balancing test.
177. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 403, 39 L. Ed. 481,
491 (1895). See generally Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 299, 15 S. Ct.
628, 633, 39 L. Ed. 704, 708-09 (1895); Raffour v. United States, 284 F. 720 (9th
Cir. 1922); Sylvia v. United States, 264 F. 593 (6th Cir. 1920).
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